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NEGLIGENCE-DUTY OF CARE-MANUFACTURER'S DuTY To WARN OF 
OBVIOUS DANGERS-Plaintiff purchased a "Lithe-Line" exerciser, a rub-
ber rope forty inches long with a loop on each end, manufactured 
by defendant Helena Rubenstein, Inc. With the exerciser plaintiff received 
a leaflet of instructions stating that "anybody" could reduce with it, and 
containing sketches and descriptions of eight exercises. While plaintiff 
was lying on the floor with the rope under her feet doing one of the 
exercises, the rope slipped off her feet and snapped back, hitting her in 
the eye and causing partial loss of vision. She sued the manufacturer for 
negligence,! alleging that the exerciser was inherently dangerous when 
used as directed, and that defendant had a duty to warn her of such 
danger. The district court granted defendant's motion for summary 
judgment. On appeal, held, affirmed, four judges dissenting. A manufac-
turer has no duty to warn of an obvious danger. That the impact and 
extent of recoil of a rubber rope are proportional to the tension placed 
1 Plaintiff also unsuccessfully sued the retailer. 
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upon it, and · that the rope might slip, are dangers so obvious as to 
warrant summary judgment without submission of the case to the jury. 
Jamieson v. Woodward & Lothrop, (D.C. Cir. 1957) 247 F. (2d) 23. 
If a manufacturer, supplying an article inherently dangerous for use 
in its existing state, realizes or should realize that the article is dangerous, 
and the ultimate purchaser cannot justifiably be expected to recognize 
the danger, the manufacturer has a duty to warn the purchaser of the 
dangerous condition.2 When the article is of simple construction, and its 
properties are a matter of common knowledge so that the dangers are 
obvious to the uneducated purchaser as well as to the manufacturer, a 
duty to warn becomes superfluous and unnecessary as a matter of law.3 
Thus ·there is no duty to warn that a knife or axe will cut, a match will 
take fire, dynamite will explode, or a hammer will mash a finger.4 Like-
wise, since the dangers arising from the explosive nature of phosphorous5 
and the highly inflammable quality of a "Fuzzy-Wuzzy" lounging robe6 
are commonly apparent, it has been held that there is no duty to warn 
of these dangers as a matter of law. Also kept from the jury have been 
actions in which personal injuries resulted from splashing a cleansing 
agent into the eye,7 pulling a starting rope on a gasoline motor,8 and 
2 See 2 TORTS RESTATEMENT §§388, 392 (1934); James, "Products Liability,'' 34 TEX. 
L. REv. 44 (1955); Dillard and Hart, "Product Liability: Directions for Use and the Duty 
To Warn," 41 VA. L. REv. 145 (1955). The situation should also be considered where 
injury results, not to the purchaser or user as in the principal case, but .to a casual by-
stander. 2 TORTS REsTATEMENT §388, comment d (1934) states that the manufacturer's 
liability for failure to warn of the dangerous condition of the chattel extends " .•. to 
third persons in whose vicinity the supplier intends or should expect it to be used." 
To the effect that knowledge by the purchaser of the danger may be an intervening 
cause insulating the manufacturer from liability, see Farley v. Edward E. Tower Co., 
271 Mass. 230, 171 N.E. 639 (1930). 
s Some courts have considered the question of apparentness of danger as pertinent 
to the issue of contributory negligence or assumption of the risk by plaintiff. See De 
Eugenio v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., (3d Cir. 1954) 210 F. (2d) 409; Karsteadt v. Phillip 
Gross H. & S. Co., 179 Wis. 110, 190 N.W. 844 (1922). But see Dillard and Hart, "Product 
Liability: Directions for Use and the Duty To Warn," 41 VA. L. REv. 145 at 163 (1955), 
stating that " ... they are theoretically inapplicable when the defendant's breach of 
duty is based on a failure to warn. To allow these defenses is to indulge in circular reason-
ing, since usually the plaintiff cannot be said to have assumed a risk of which he was 
ignorant or to have contributed to his own injury when he had no way of reasonably 
ascertaining that the danger of injury existed." This language was cited with approval 
in Wright v. Carter Products, Inc., (2d Cir. 1957) 244 F. (2d) 53. 
4 Principal case at 26; Dempsey v. Virginia Dare Stores, Inc., 239 Mo. App. 355, 
186 S.W. (2d) 217 (1945). See also James, "Products Liability,'' 34 TEX. L. REv. 44 at 51 
(1955). 
5 Gibson v. Torbert, 115 Iowa 163, 88 N.W. 443 (1901). But cf. Wellington v. Downer 
Kerosene Oil Co., 104 Mass. 64 (1870), holding that whether people knew dangerous 
qualities of naphtha is a jury question. 
6 Dempsey v. Virginia Dare Stores, Inc., note 4 supra. Cf. Noone v. Fred Perlberg, Inc., 
268 App. Div. 149, 49 N.Y.S. (2d) 460 (1944), affd. 294 N.Y. 680, 60 N.E. (2d) 839 (1945), 
reinstating a jury verdict for plaintiff holding defendant liable for failure to warn that 
the netting of a dress treated with nitro-cellulose sizing was highly inflammable. 
7 Sawyer v. Pine Oil Sales Co., (5th Cir. 1946) 155 F. (2d) 855. 
s Pontifex v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., (4th Cir. 1955) 226 F. (2d) 909. 
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bringing one's hands into contact with caustic ready-mix concrete.9 When, 
however, the article or process involved is less common or more compli-
cated, so that the manufacturer because of superior technical knowledge 
should realize the danger, whereas the less experienced user might not, 
the issue becomes a jury question.10 Whether a worker should realize that 
dynamite will prematurely explode from heat in the borehole or vibra-
tions from nearby drilling has therefore been held a matter for the jury 
to determine.11 So also the possible dangers inherent in too short a boom 
cable on a crane12 or a drum of sulphuric acid left to heat in the sun13 
were sufficiently obscure to warrant submitting the question to the jury. 
A third group of cases, in which the manufacturer by representing that 
his product is "harmless" lulls the user into a false sense of security, indi-
cates an even greater hesitance on the part of judges to find for the man-
ufacturer as a matter of law.14 Thus the manufacturer who advertised 
that sparks from a sparkler15 or a toy gun16 were "harmless" faced a jury 
determination of whether the user was aware of the danger when injury 
in fact resulted. Summary judgment in the principal case can therefore 
be justified only if the rubber exerciser falls within the first class of articles 
whose dangerous qualities are equally apparent to the user and the man-
ufacturer. The dissenting judges argued that defendant's representation 
that "anybody" could reduce with the exerciser might well have induced 
false security in the plaintiff, and thus the case was for the jury under 
a theory similar to that of the "harmless sparkler" decision.17 Including 
the exerciser in the first group, however, is a logical extension of that 
category to include somewhat less common, but simple non-mechanical 
devices, which are based on universally known principles and which 
possess physical attributes identical with everyday articles of familiar 
character. Here the exerciser was merely a forty-inch rubber rope having 
no mechanical parts or latent defects. It was designed on the same princi-
ple and presented similar inherent dangers as a rubber band or sling-
shot. It is a matter of common knowledge, obvious to the user as well as to 
o Dalton v. Pioneer Sand & Gravel Co., 37 Wash. (2d) 946, 227 P. (2d) 173 (1951). 
10 See 2 TORTS REsTATEJ\IENT §388, comment i (1934). 
11 Hopkins v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., (3d Cir. 1952) 199 F. (2d) 930. Cf. 
Hopkins v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., (3d Cir. 1954) 212 F. (2d) 623, cert. den. sub 
nom. Hopkins Admx. v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours 8: Co., 348 U.S. 872 (1954), reversing 
a jury verdict for plaintiff, holding as a matter of law that since the blasting foreman 
had knowledge of the danger, the manufacturer was not negligent in failing to warn. 
12 Lambert v. Richards-Kelly Constr. Co., 348 Pa. 407, 35 A. (2d) 76 (1944). 
13 Gall v. Union Ice Co., 108 Cal. App. (2d) 303, 239 P. (2d) 48 (1951). 
14 See 2 TORTS REsTATEJ\IENT §388, comment b (1934). 
15 Henry v. Crook, 202 App. Div. 19, 195 N.Y.S. 642 (1922). 
16 Crist v. Art Metal Works, 230 App. Div. 114, 243 N.Y.S. 496 (1930), affd. 255 N.Y. 
624, 175 N.E. 341 (1931). But note dissent arguing toy was of simple construction, that 
it was a matter of common knowledge that sparks applied to inflammable material will 
start a fire, and that the toy gun was not inherently dangerous. 
17 Principal case at 37 et seq. 
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the manufacturer, that when these articles are stretched, they may slip, and 
if they slip, they will snap back with a force proportional fo the amount 
of tension placed upon them. Representing that "anybody" could reduce 
by using the exerciser would not make these dangers less apparent to 
the adult user in the principal case, as the representation that something 
was "harmless" might make an otherwise obvious danger less apparent to 
a child. Therefore, no jury question was presented. To hold otherwise, 
and permit the jury to determine whether these dangers were obvious to 
the plaintiff, would place an unjustifiable burden on the manufacturer in 
the present atmosphere of recognized jury leniency toward the personal 
injury plaintiff. 
George R. Haydon, Jr. 
